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Abstract: We present the first formal analysis of two avionic protocols that aim to secure
air-ground communications, the ARINC823 public-key and shared-key protocols. We verify these
protocols both in the symbolic model of cryptography, using ProVerif, and in the computational
model, using CryptoVerif. While we confirm many security properties of these protocols, we also
find several weaknesses, attacks, and imprecisions in the standard. We propose fixes for these prob-
lems. This case study required the specification of new cryptographic primitives in CryptoVerif.
It also illustrates the complementarity between symbolic and computational verification.
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Vérification mécanisée, symbolique et calculatoire,
des protocoles avioniques ARINC823
Résumé : Nous présentons la première analyse formelle de deux protocoles avioniques qui visent
à sécuriser les communications air-sol, les protocoles ARINC823 à clé publique et à clé partagée.
Nous vérifions ces protocoles, à la fois dans le modèle symbolique de la cryptographie, en utilisant
ProVerif, et dans le modèle calculatoire, en utilisant CryptoVerif. Si nous confirmons beaucoup
de propriétés de sécurité de ces protocoles, nous trouvons aussi plusieurs faiblesses, attaques, et
imprécisions dans le standard. Nous proposons des corrections pour ces problèmes. Cette étude
de cas a nécessité la spécification de nouvelles primitives cryptographiques dans CryptoVerif. Elle
illustre aussi la complémentarité entre la vérification symbolique et la vérification calculatoire.
Mots-clés : protocoles cryptographiques, vérification, modèle symbolique, modèle calculatoire
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1 Introduction
Securing electronic communications between aircrafts and ground entities (control towers, air-
lines) becomes more and more important. Indeed, such electronic communications convey more
and more important information and aircrafts are prominent targets for attacks, such as terrorist
attacks. So, even if most air-ground communications are currently sent in the clear, the adoption
of secured communications seems unavoidable.
Several standards have been developed [2,34,35] or are in development (third edition of [34]) in
order to secure these communications. In this paper, we study the ARINC823 standard [2]. This
standard aims to secure ACARS (Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System)
messages. These messages are short text messages, which include air traffic control messages,
such as clearance messages, flight plans, weather information, as well as maintenance messages,
so that needed maintenance operations can be planed at the next airport.
In addition to security (authentication and secrecy of the messages), other goals are apparent
in the design of the standard:
• Bandwidth: the available bandwidth is limited and the ACARS messages are relatively
short, so the protocol is designed to minimize the additional bandwidth required for secu-
rity.
• Resistance to failures: the messages are conveyed even in case of failure of the security
system.
• Flexibility: the protocol is designed to provide different levels of security: authentication
and secrecy, authentication only, and no security, on a message-per-message basis.
These additional goals justify the design of specific protocols. The ARINC823 standard provides
two such protocols: a public-key protocol and a shared-key protocol. (The latter assumes that
the aircraft and the ground entity share a long-term secret key.) To our knowledge, the public-
key protocol has been implemented and is currently used by one major airline. We do not know
of a current usage of the shared-key protocol, but it might be used in the future.
Other avionic protocols share the constraints of low bandwidth and resistance to failures, but
some of them are much simpler. For instance, the third edition of [34] just aims at authentication
and does not require flexibility, so its analysis does not need to consider as many cases as the
one of the ARINC823 standard.
In order to obtain guarantees that the ARINC823 protocols are secure, we use mechanized
protocol verification tools. These tools typically rely on one of the following two models of
cryptography:
• The symbolic model, so-called Dolev-Yao model [31, 39], is an abstract model in which
cryptographic primitives are considered as perfect black-boxes, messages are terms on these
primitives, and the adversary is restricted to apply only these primitives. This model
facilitates formal verification, and many automatic protocol verifiers (AVISPA [3], F7 [12],
FDR [37], ProVerif [21], Scyther [28], Tamarin [45], . . . ) exist in this model.
• The computational model [48], typically used for manual cryptographic proofs, is more
concrete. In this model, messages are bitstrings, cryptographic primitives are functions on
these bitstrings, and the adversary is any probabilistic Turing machine. Formal verification
is more difficult in this model, and most proofs are manual. Some mechanized verifiers exist
(CryptoVerif [17, 18], CertiCrypt [7, 8] and its successor EasyCrypt [4, 6], Computational
F7 [15] and its successors F? and rF? [5]).
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We consider both models in our study, and rely on ProVerif (http://proverif.inria.fr) for the
symbolic analysis and on CryptoVerif (http://cryptoverif.inria.fr) for the computational
analysis. Our analysis does not consider side-channels (such as timing and power consumption),
and works on a model of the protocol, not on an implementation. Our goal is to verify the
ARINC823 standard, not a particular implementation (to which we did not have access). Having
a secure standard is an essential first step, even if additional weaknesses may appear at the
implementation level.
1.1 Contributions
We formally model both the public-key (Section 2) and the shared-key (Section 3) ARINC823
protocols, in ProVerif and CryptoVerif. Our models are available at http://prosecco.inria.
fr/personal/bblanche/arinc823/We study many security properties of these protocols: fresh-
ness of messages, absence of replays, authentication, secrecy, forward secrecy, resistance to key
compromise impersonation attacks. While we confirm important properties (the public-key pro-
tocol guarantees secrecy and authentication of the application data messages), we also find several
weaknesses and imprecisions in the standard, in particular related to the resistance to failures
and to the protection against replays. In the shared-key protocol, a subtle, computational replay
attack may lead to the breach of secrecy. We propose fixes for these weaknesses, and prove their
security. Moreover, the protocols use undesirable cryptographic constructions; in particular, they
share keys between several primitives. The public-key protocol does not satisfy forward secrecy
and is subject to key compromise impersonation attacks. While these security properties may
not be explicit requirements of the standard, the protocol can be strengthened to guarantee them
and to avoid key sharing between primitives. We propose such a strengthened protocol and verify
it.
We reported our results to Honeywell, the industry editor for and a key technical contributor
to the ARINC823 standard. Honeywell gave us helpful feedback on our analysis of the public-key
protocol, which they implement. We summarize this feedback in the rest of this paper.
This case study required the specification of new cryptographic primitives in CryptoVerif:
a joint assumption between gap Diffie-Hellman and signatures (Section 2.3 2)), and a counter-
mode encryption scheme (Section 2.3 5)). As we shall see, this case study also illustrates the
complementarity between verification in the symbolic and in the computational models and the
usage of manual arguments in order to complement some ProVerif proofs.
1.2 Related Work
Other approaches to protocol verification have already been discussed above. Many other cases
studies have been conducted using ProVerif (see [16] for references), a few using CryptoVerif [1,
14, 20, 22, 24, 46]. This study is one of the rare that combine both tools [13, 36]: [36] studies
the Signal messaging protocol and [13] studies TLS 1.3 Draft-18. Those two studies generate
ProVerif scripts from JavaScript code for symbolic verification, and additionally use manually
written CryptoVerif scripts to obtain computational guarantees. This study is probably the one
that exploits most the complementarity between these tools. We do not know of any previous
formal verification of the ARINC823 protocols.
2 AMS Protocol using Public/Private Keys
In this section, we study the AMS (ACARS Message Security) protocol using public/private keys
as defined in [2, Attachment 7].
Inria
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Aircraft U Ground entity V
Ground-initiated trigger
AMS_Init_IND message
m0 = (H0, Init_IND,U,V, [certV], tV)
sV = SIG(dV, (V,U,m0))
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Secure session initiation
AMS_Init_REQ message
m1 = (H1, Init_REQ,Policy ,U,V,Algos, tU)
sU = SIG(dU, (U,V,m1))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
AMS_Init_RSP message
m2 = (H2, Init_RSP+,AlgSel , [certV], tU,RandV)
MAC(KMACU,V, (V,U,m2,Algos, tU, sU))
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Application data exchange
m = (H,Cmd ,ENC(KENCU,V, (0, CDN),Payload), CDN)
MAC(KMACU,V, (U,V,m))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
m = (H,Cmd ,ENC(KENCU,V, (1, CUP),Payload), CUP)
MAC(KMACU,V, (V,U,m))
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Figure 1: Simplified AMS protocol using public/private keys
2.1 Protocol Description
Let us first provide a simplified description of the protocol; our models cover the full specification.
The protocol establishes a secure session between an aircraft U and a ground entity V, as shown
in Figure 1. The aircraft initially has an elliptic curve key pair (secret key dU and public key
QU) and similarly the ground entity has an elliptic curve key pair (secret key dV and public key
QV). The ground entity may request that the aircraft initiates a secure session. In this case, it
sends a ground-initiated trigger, AMS_Init_IND, which consists of a header field H0, a constant
command Init_IND for initiation indication, the identities of the aircraft U and ground entity
V, optionally the certificate certV for the public key QV of V (the certificate must be present
if the aircraft does not already have it), and a timestamp tV. This message is signed with the
secret key dV. Upon receipt of this message, the aircraft verifies its own identity, the certificate
if present, the signature, and verifies that the timestamp tV is recent enough:
t− 60 seconds ≤ tV ≤ t+ 120 seconds.
where t is the current time at the aircraft. Then, it initiates a secure session. The aircraft may
also directly initiate a secure session; the ground-initiated trigger is then omitted.
To initiate a secure session, the aircraft sends an AMS_Init_REQ message, which consists of
a header field H1, a constant command Init_REQ for initiation request, an identifier Policy for
a security policy that determines when messages are encrypted and/or MACed, the identities of
the aircraft U and ground entity V, the algorithms Algos that the aircraft supports (encryption,
MAC, compression), and a timestamp tU. This message is signed with the secret key dU. Upon
receipt of this message, the ground entity V verifies its own identity, gets the aircraft certificate
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for the public key QU from its local storage or from a PKI certificate distribution service, verifies
the signature, verifies that (Algos, tU, sU) is unique for the aircraft initiating a new session, and
verifies that the timestamp tU is recent enough:
t− 60 seconds ≤ tU ≤ t+ 120 seconds. (1)
where t is the current time at the ground entity. It selects supported algorithms among those
proposed by the aircraft, and stores them in AlgSel , computes a shared Diffie-Hellman secret
ZU,V = dVQU, chooses a 32-bit random value RandV, and computes the following values:
XU,V = HASH((Algos, tU, sU,RandV))
KMACU,V = KDF(ZU,V;m; concatSI(1,MAC_algo, XU,V,U,V,m))
KENCU,V = KDF(ZU,V;n; concatSI(2,ENC_algo, XU,V,U,V, n))
where the hash function HASH is SHA256, MAC_algo is the selected MAC algorithm and m
is the length of its keys, ENC_algo is the selected encryption algorithm and n is the length
of its keys, the function concatSI concatenates its arguments, the key derivation function KDF
is defined by ANSI X9.63 but uses SHA256 instead of SHA1 as underlying hash function, and
KDF(Z;m;X) returns an m-bit key.
Then the ground entity sends the AMS_Init_RSP message, which consists of a header field
H2, a constant command Init_RSP+ for a positive initiation response (a Init_RSP− message
may be sent when the ground entity rejects the secure session), the selected algorithms AlgSel ,
optionally the certificate certV for the public key QV of V (the certificate must be present if the
aircraft does not already have it), the timestamp tU, and the random value RandV. This message
is MACed together with the fields Algos, tU, sU received in the AMS_Init_REQ message, using
the key KMACU,V.
Upon receipt of this message, the aircraft verifies that the received timestamp tU is equal to
the one it sent in the AMS_Init_REQ message, verifies the certificate if present, computes the
shared Diffie-Hellman secret ZU,V = dUQV, computes XU,V, KMACU,V, and KENCU,V as above,
and verifies the MAC.
When all these steps succeed, the aircraft and ground entity can exchange application data
messages in an encrypt-then-MAC tunnel, using KENCU,V as encryption key and KMACU,V as
MAC key. They use two distinct counters CDN and CUP, one in each direction, to order the
messages and to prevent replays. These counters are incremented when a message is sent or
received in the considered direction.
The specified MAC algorithm is HMAC-SHA256, truncated to 32, 64, or 128 bits. The
specified encryption algorithm is AES128-CFB128. The specified compression algorithms are
Dynamic Markov Compression and DEFLATE. These algorithms are chosen with bandwidth
in mind: the MACs are rather short, the encryption algorithm is such that the length of the
ciphertext is equal to the length of the plaintext (at the bit level), and compression may be
used. The protocol allows specifying additional algorithms in the future, which are negotiated
via the fields Algos and AlgSel . The MAC and encryption algorithms are chosen at the beginning
of the protocol. The compression algorithm may vary for each message, among the supported
algorithms. The chosen compression algorithm is included in the header field H of each message.
When compression is active, the payload is compressed before encryption.
The protocol offers 4 protection modes for the messages:
• BOTH: the message is encrypted then MACed.
• AUTH: the message is just MACed.
Inria
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• NONE: no encryption nor MAC.
• SIGN: the message is signed.
Protection mode SIGN is used only in the AMS_Init_IND and AMS_Init_REQ messages. The
AMS_Init_RSP message always uses protection mode AUTH. The application data messages
may use the modes BOTH (as represented in Figure 1), AUTH, or NONE. The protection mode
of each message is included in the header field H. It is chosen based on the security policy of
identifier Policy and the type of message sent. Finally, the aircraft may or may not support
encryption. In the latter case, messages are never encrypted, even in protection mode BOTH.
2.2 Modeling Notes
Our models of this protocol have the following features:
1) Sessions. The models consider a single honest aircraft U and a single honest ground entity
V. Other aircrafts and ground entities are included in the adversary. The aircraft U is willing to
run the protocol with any ground entity, and the ground entity V is willing to run the protocol
with any aircraft. We prove security properties for the sessions between the honest aircraft U
and ground entity V.
The public-key protocol and the shared-key protocol do not share secrets, so we can consider
them separately without missing attacks: the shared-key protocol is supposed to be included in
the adversary when we analyze the public-key protocol.
The models consider an unbounded number of executions of the protocol.
2) Algorithms. The models consider only the algorithms currently specified for compression,
encryption, and MAC. We do not model any algorithms reserved for future use. In the future, it
might be interesting to verify that the algorithm negotiation remains secure even if algorithms
are added.
3) Certificates. The certificates are modeled in a fairly abstract way: the certificate that QU
is the public key of U is modeled as a signature of the pair (U, QU) under the secret key sCA of
a certificate authority.
4) Equations for encoding and compression. To model that encoding and compression are
the identity when they are OFF, ProVerif uses equations encode(encode_OFF, x ) = x and
compress(comp_OFF, x ) = x . These equations considerably increase the runtime and memory
consumption of ProVerif, to the point that ProVerif could not prove authentication for the public-
key protocol with these equations. Indeed, with these equations, ProVerif needs to consider two
cases for each encode operation: either the mode is encode_OFF, and the encode operation is
the identity, or it is another mode, and encode is a non-identity function, considered as a free
function symbol. The same holds for compress and for the reverse operations, so the number of
cases to consider doubles for each encode, decode, compress, and decompress. Therefore, we omit
these equations, to avoid such case distinctions. CryptoVerif proves desired properties for any
injective encoding and compression functions, in particular those that satisfy these equations.
5) Timestamps. The specification [2, Table 7.2.1-1, Step N04, Item 3] says that a timestamp
tU is accepted at time t when (1) holds. We found this inequality surprising: if we suppose that
the message may take between 0 and 60 seconds to go from one entity to the other, and the
clocks can differ by at most 60 seconds, we obtain
t− 120 seconds ≤ tU ≤ t+ 60 seconds (2)
rather than the inequality (1). Honeywell confirmed that there is a typo in the standard and
that (2) is the correct inequality. We rely on the corrected inequality in the rest of this document.
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We use the following abstract model of timestamps. We define a channel timech on which we
input the current time, and a predicate check_time such that check_time(tU, t) is true if and only
if (2). In the models, since ProVerif and CryptoVerif cannot model time precisely, the channel
timech is in fact a public channel, so the adversary can send anything on it, and the definition
of the predicate check_time is left unspecified, so the proofs done by ProVerif and CryptoVerif
are valid for any definition of check_time.
6) Replay protection. We do not model the check mentioned in [2, Table 7.2.1-1, Step N07,
Item 4]:
[The ground entity] verifies that the received AMS_Appendix field [Algos, tU, sU in
Figure 1] is unique for the aircraft initiating a new session.
Note 1—This check is necessary to ensure that the received AMS_Init_REQ message
is associated with a new initiation request and not an ACARS retransmission of an
AMS_Init_REQ message for which a secure session is already established.
Above, the AMS_Appendix field is considered non-unique when a session with the aircraft is
established with that appendix [2, Table 7.2.1-2, Step N07, Case 2].
Even though replays of AMS_Init_REQ messages may not be problematic, we clarify that,
in order to avoid all such replays, it is not enough to verify that the received AMS_Appendix
field does not occur in the AMS_Init_REQ messages of currently established sessions. With this
check, in case a session terminates at a time t such that t− 120 seconds ≤ tU, the adversary can
replay the initial AMS_Init_REQ message just after the session terminates, and this message
will be accepted. To avoid all replays, the check should be defined as follows.
For each aircraft U, the ground entity should remember the AMS_Appendix field of the
AMS_Init_REQ messages received from U with the most recent timestamp tU, as long as
tU is such that t − 120 seconds ≤ tU where t is the ground entity’s local time. (Replays of
AMS_Init_REQ messages older than 120 seconds are discarded by checking the timestamp.) A
new AMS_Init_REQ message received from U should be accepted if and only if its timestamp
tU satisfies (2), and it is strictly more recent than the remembered timestamp tU or it is equal
to the remembered tU and AMS_Appendix field is not among the remembered AMS_Appendix
fields. (The AMS_Appendix field includes the signature sU which is probabilistic, so each ses-
sion uses a different signature, and hence a different AMS_Appendix field. A message with an
AMS_Appendix field that has already been seen is therefore a replay.) This check guarantees
that the ground entity never accepts two AMS_Init_REQ messages with the same U, sU, tU.
Moreover, in the case of a ground-initiated trigger, the uniqueness of the AMS_Appendix
field is never checked. As a result, the adversary can replay the AMS_Init_IND message as long
as its timestamp tV satisfies the inequality t− 120 seconds ≤ tV ≤ t+ 60 seconds, where t is the
aircraft entity’s local time. In particular, if the adversary replays the AMS_Init_IND message
while a secure session is established between the aircraft and the ground entity, this message
will be accepted by the aircraft; according to [2, Table 7.2.2-1, Step G08, Item 2], this replay
will cause the just started session to end and a new secure session to be initiated. If the entities
handle a secure session restart by sending again the messages of the previous session, the attack
may cause messages to be delayed by up to 120 seconds (perhaps using several replays of the first
AMS_Init_IND message). It may also have more serious consequences if the entities forget the
messages they cannot send in the initial session due to the unexpected termination. To avoid
this attack, we recommend protecting against replays of the AMS_Init_IND message by using
a check similar to the one mentioned above for the AMS_Init_REQ message. Honeywell agrees
with the anti-replay checks we recommend.
7) Message counter. ProVerif and CryptoVerif cannot fully model the incrementation of the
message counter and the tests performed on this counter to accept or reject the message. In
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ProVerif, the value of the counter is input on a public channel and the tests are omitted. The
CryptoVerif model is more precise: it models that the sender never reuses the same counter in
the same session, and that the receiver rejects a message when it has already seen a message
with the same counter in the same session. It still omits that
highest received count− 5 ≤ current received count ≤ highest received count+ 5
as mentioned in the message count windowing criteria [2, Table 7.3.1-1, Step D08]. (These
windowing criteria allow a counter smaller than the highest received counter, to allow receiving
out-of-order messages, which may happen when the network is not entirely reliable.) The proved
security properties hold a fortiori with this additional check.
8) Resistance to failures. [2, page 133, note 1] reads:
If triggering secure session initiation is unsuccessful after an initial attempt and one
re-attempt, then the ground entity assumes AMS is unavailable for the aircraft entity
and sends queued messages in the clear.
Similarly, [2, page 130, note 1] reads:
If secure session initiation is unsuccessful after an initial attempt and a configurable
number of re-attempts, then the aircraft entity executes a configurable unavailable
action, as described in Section 3.5.4.
and [2, Section 3.5.4] specifies
Possible actions may include, but are not limited to, the following:
• Attempt to send the message to an alternate AMS-equipped entity specified by
the airline.
• Send the message in the clear bypassing AMS.
• Do not send the message.
Honeywell points out that, when an AMS-equipped aircraft entity is not able to establish a se-
cure session with a ground entity, stakeholders (e.g., avionics suppliers, datalink service providers,
airlines) that contributed to the development of the standard agreed that the ARINC 823 specifi-
cation should include flexibility such that implementers may provide such customer-configurable
actions.
This behavior may cause obvious security breaches when messages are sent in the clear: if an
adversary manages to intercept or jam messages so that the secure session initiation fails even
though AMS is actually available, then it will get the sent messages in the clear, thus breaking
secrecy.
The intention of communicating the messages even in case of failure of the security system
is understandable, but it conflicts with the goal of securing the communication: security is
guaranteed only when a secure session is established. We recommend taking additional actions
in case secure session initiation fails or messages are sent or received outside secure sessions,
such as informing the pilot and reporting the problem to a computer maintenance team on the
ground. We recommend mentioning that in the standard, even though Honeywell points out
that user notifications and problem reporting are considered local implementation issues that
are not within scope of the AMS interoperability specification. Our models include only the
behavior inside secure sessions, so in our models, no message is sent in the clear when secure
session initiation fails. With the migitations mentioned above, our security results still hold for
the full protocol when no problem is reported to the pilot or to the ground maintenance.
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9) Policy check. The models include the verification that messages were transmitted with the
correct protection mode, as specified by the security policy [2, Section 3.6.2, pages 29–31].
We model these checks in CryptoVerif using a function get_policy such that get_policy(policy ,
msg) is the protection mode (NONE, AUTH, or BOTH) of the message msg in the policy policy .
The function get_policy is left unspecified, so that the result holds for any such function. In
ProVerif, we cannot leave functions unspecified, we can only leave predicates unspecified (by
declaring that they “block”), so we use a predicate policy_ok(policy , prot ,msg) to mean that
prot is the protection mode of msg in the policy policy .
These checks are essential for security. In particular, an unprotected message should never
be accepted when the policy specifies a protection AUTH or BOTH, otherwise the authenticity
of the message can be broken. These checks are correctly mentioned as mandatory in the body
of the specification [2, Section 3.6.2, page 29]:
When a secure session is established between communicating peer aircraft and ground
entities, the receiving entity verifies all received messages to ensure correct application
of the security policy.
However, they are omitted in the description of the protocol in [2, Attachment 7]. We recommend
adding them there. Honeywell agrees that it may be helpful to include a reference to Section
3.6.2 in Attachment 7, but points out that the commentary in Attachment 7, Section 7.1 clearly
states that the AMS protocol process steps are included as guidance and the provisions in the
main body of the document must be followed precisely.
Moreover, since messages may be sent in the clear when a secure session cannot be established
(Section 2.2 8)), the receiving entity has to accept messages independently of the security policy
outside secure sessions. This behavior comes with security risks: if no secure session is established,
for instance because the adversary jammed secure session initiation messages, then the adversary
can send its messages to the receiving entity, which will accept them, so authenticity will be
broken. As we already noted in Section 2.2 8), security is guaranteed only when a secure session
is established, and our models include only the behavior inside secure sessions. In this case, the
receiving entity always verifies the correct application of the security policy.
10) MAC length. The specification is not explicit on what the aircraft does with the MAC
length that is part of the AlgSel field of the AMS_Init_RSP message that it receives from the
ground entity. If the protocol runs normally, the ground entity sends back the MAC length
chosen by the aircraft. However, [2, Table 7.2.1-1] does not say what the aircraft should do when
the MAC length it receives differs from the one it sent.
We stress that the aircraft should not set the MAC length based on AlgSel (in contrast to
what it does for the MAC algorithm). Indeed, suppose that the aircraft sets its MAC length to
the length received in AlgSel . The aircraft has initially sent a MAC length l in the field Algos
of the AMS_Init_REQ message. If the adversary cannot forge MACs of length l but can forge
MACs of another length l′, it can set the MAC length in AlgSel to l′ and forge the MAC of the
AMS_Init_RSP message for the length l′ (either by modifying the AMS_Init_RSP message
sent by the ground entity or by building its own). The aircraft would then accept this message.
The adversary may then continue forging MACs of length l′ for subsequent messages. This is a
downgrading attack in which the achieved security level corresponds to the weakest MAC length
(the shortest), even though the aircraft may have initially selected a stronger MAC length.
The following two behaviors avoid this problem:
• The aircraft ignores the MAC length in AlgSel , and always uses the MAC length it sent.
Our models assume this behavior.
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• The aircraft verifies that the MAC length in AlgSel is the same as the MAC length it sent.
Otherwise, it discards the AMS_Init_RSP message.
Honeywell disagrees that the specification is not explicit on this point. They confirm that the
MAC length is dictated by the aircraft and cannot be changed by the ground, and mention that
the treatment of the MAC length is explained in [2, Table 7.2.1-1, Step N02, Item 1, Bullet 4]:
AlgIDU, aircraft entity crypto-algorithm identifier, which indicates the configured
MAC length, and the message authentication and encryption algorithms supported
by the aircraft entity
and in [2, Section 5.2.2]:
The AMS Algorithm Select Type (AMS_AlgSelType) is a 16-bit parameter type used
to confirm the selected MAC length and [...]
We still recommend making explicit the reaction of the aircraft when the MAC length it receives
differs from the one it sent, to avoid any misinterpretation of the standard.
2.3 Security Assumptions on Primitives
ProVerif uses the symbolic model, in which messages are terms, so the model cannot be accurate
at the bit level. Bitstring concatenation is modeled as tuples. Cryptographic primitives are
supposed to be perfect. Diffie-Hellman key agreements are modeled by the equation dUQV =
dVQU; all other algebraic relations are ignored.
In contrast, CryptoVerif relies on the computational model of cryptography. The CryptoVerif
model is exact at the bit level. It uses the following assumptions:
1) Certificates. The signatures used in certificates are unforgeable under chosen-message
attacks (UF-CMA) [33]. These signatures may use a scheme different from the one used in the
protocol to sign messages under dU or dV.
2) Signatures and Diffie-Hellman. The long-term key pairs of the aircraft and the ground
entity are used for ECDSA signatures and for Diffie-Hellman key exchanges. Therefore, we need
a joint security assumption on the signatures and the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, which is non-
standard. We assume that ECDSA signatures are unforgeable under chosen-message attacks
(UF-CMA) [23] and that the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption [43] holds with common
keys.
For our anti-replay protection, we need strong unforgeability: if the signatures are just un-
forgeable, an adversary can replay the AMS_Init_REQ message by using a different signature
for the same message, and thus pass our anti-replay protection. However, standard ECDSA
signatures are malleable: if (r, s) is a valid signature, then so is (r, (−s) mod n) where n is the
curve order. This malleability can be avoided by requiring that s is less than n/2 [47]. For the
protocol with replay protection, we assume this additional restriction, so that ECDSA signa-
tures are strongly unforgeable under chosen-message attacks (SUF-CMA) [23] and that the gap
Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption [43] holds with common keys. We do not make this stronger
assumption for the original protocol, since the standard does not mention such a restriction.
These assumptions are defined in CryptoVerif by allowing calls to signature oracles in the
gap Diffie-Hellman assumption, and calls to Diffie-Hellman oracles in the (S)UF-CMA signature
assumption (see Appendix A).
Additionally, we need a collision resistance property for signatures: two signatures (generated
with distinct fresh randomness) have a negligible probability of being equal. This property holds
for ECDSA signatures, because if two signatures with randomness r1 and r2 respectively are
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equal, then r1.G and r2.G have the same first coordinate modulo n, where G is the considered
group generator and n is its order. This property has a negligible probability of happening for
independent random r1 and r2. This property is important for the security of the protocol: using
deterministic signatures would remove any randomness from the AMS_Init_REQ message, so
that two AMS_Init_REQ messages with the same timestamp would be equal, leading to the
same replay attacks as those we find for the shared-key protocol (Section 3.4).
3) Key derivation. We assume that the concatenation of the key derivation functions KDF256
and KDF128 defined by
KDF256(k, (X,U, V )) = KDF(k; 256; concatSI(1,HMAC-SHA256, X, U, V, 256))
KDF128(k, (X,U, V )) = KDF(k; 128; concatSI(2,AES128-CFB128, X, U, V, 128))
is a random oracle [11]. We justify this assumption in Appendix B, assuming that the compression
function of SHA256 is a random oracle. Using a single random oracle and splitting its result into
two keys yields more efficient verification in CryptoVerif than using two independent random
oracles.
4) MAC. We assume that the truncation of HMAC-SHA256 (to 32, 64, and 128 bits, as used
in the protocol) is an SUF-CMA MAC. This property holds assuming that HMAC-SHA256 is a
pseudo-random function (PRF). Indeed, the truncation of a PRF is also a PRF, and a PRF is an
SUF-CMA MAC [10, Section 2.4]. By [9], HMAC-SHA256 is a PRF if the compression function
of SHA256 is a PRF, using its first argument as key, and also using its second argument as key
under a related key attack.
5) Encryption. The initialization vector (IV) of the encryption scheme is computed as IV =
E(KENCU,V, 0; IVdata) where E(k, IV ,m) is the AES128-CFB128 encryption of m under the key
k with IV IV and IVdata is basically a counter [2, Table 7.3.1-1, Step D03, Item 1].
By definition of the CFB encryption mode [40], we have
IV = AES128(KENCU,V, 0)⊕ IVdata (3)
where ⊕ is exclusive or. However, [40, Appendix C] says:
For the CBC and CFB modes, the IVs must be unpredictable. In particular, for any
given plaintext, it must not be possible to predict the IV that will be associated to
the plaintext in advance of the generation of the IV.
There are two recommended methods for generating unpredictable IVs. The first
method is to apply the forward cipher function, under the same key that is used for
the encryption of the plaintext, to a nonce. The nonce must be a data block that is
unique to each execution of the encryption operation. [...] The second method is to
generate a random data block using a FIPS-approved random number generator.
The generation of the IV in the AMS protocol does not follow these recommended methods for
generating unpredictable IVs. The first recommended method would yield
IV = AES128(KENCU,V, IVdata) (4)
Assuming that AES128 is a pseudo-random permutation (PRP) [38], formula (4) is indistinguish-
able from generating a fresh random IV for each new value of IVdata, so the IVs are unpredictable
as desired.
In contrast, formula (3) allows one to predict the whole sequence of IVs knowing the first
IV. Fortunately, the IVs remains secret in the AMS protocol, so we can still prove the protocol
secure, at the cost of a less standard proof.
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We assume that AES128 is a PRP. We let
ENC(k, IVdata,m) = E(k,E(k, 0; IVdata);m)
DEC(k, IVdata, c) = D(k,E(k, 0; IVdata); c)
and we show that DEC(k, IVdata,ENC(k, IVdata,m)) = m and that the probability of distin-
guishing
Ogen() := k
R← enc_key; return(); foreach i ≤ n do
Oenc(IVdata,m) := return(ENC(k, IVdata,m))
(5)
from
Ogen() := k
R← enc_key; return(); foreach i ≤ n do
Oenc(IVdata,m) :=
find j ≤ n suchthat defined(IVdata[j]) ∧ IVdata = IVdata[j] then
event repeatedIV
else
return(ENC(k, IVdata, Z(m)))
(6)
is at most the probability of event repeatedIV plus a negligible probability, where Z(m) is the
bitstring of the same length as m and consisting only of zeroes. The game (5) defines an oracle
Ogen that generates an encryption key k, chosen randomly with uniform probability in type
enc_key. Then, this oracle returns control to the adversary and n copies of oracle Oenc are
defined, which return the encryption of message m using the IV data IVdata. The game (6) is
similar but it executes event repeatedIV when IVdata has been previously used, and encrypts
Z(m) instead of m. This property shows that, when the IVdata is never reused, the adversary
cannot distinguish the encryption of m from the encryption of Z(m). Because CryptoVerif lacks
loops, we prove this property only on an example with 3 messages (n = 3), containing respectively
1, 2, and 3 blocks. (Details on this proof can be found in Appendix C.) It is easy to see manually
that this result generalizes to any number of messages with any number of blocks. We use that
general result as assumption in the proof of the protocol.
6) Hash function. We assume that SHA256 is collision-resistant. This property holds in
particular when the compression function of SHA256 is collision-resistant [29].
2.4 Security Analysis
Having modeled the protocol, we can use ProVerif and CryptoVerif to verify its security proper-
ties:
1) Freshness of AMS_Init_REQ and AMS_Init_IND messages. ProVerif proves this fresh-
ness, by showing the following correspondences (7) and (8):
event(recv_Init_REQ(V,U, x , sU, tU, tV)) =⇒
check_time(tU, tV) ∧ event(send_Init_REQ(U,V, x , sU, tU)).
(7)
The event recv_Init_REQ(V,U, x , sU, tU, tV) is executed when the ground entity V accepts an
AMS_Init_REQmessage x , sU from the aircraft U at time tV, and this message has timestamp tU.
(x is the message without signature, sU is its signature.) Similarly, the event send_Init_REQ(U,
V, x , sU, tU) is executed when U sends an AMS_Init_REQ message x , sU to V with timestamp
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tU. Hence, this correspondence means that, if V accepts an AMS_Init_REQ message at time tV
from U, and this message has signature sU and timestamp tU, then the message has been sent by
U to V, with the same signature sU, at time tU and check_time(tU, tV), that is, the inequality (2)
holds.
The following correspondence proves a similar property for the AMS_Init_IND message:
event(recv_Init_IND(U,V, x , sV, tV, tU)) =⇒
check_time(tV, tU) ∧ event(send_Init_IND(V,U, x , sV, tV)).
(8)
The authenticity of the timestamp comes from the signature, and the freshness is checked by the
receiver of the message.
CryptoVerif proves slightly weaker properties, due to the malleability of ECDSA signatures.
The signatures may be different on the ground and aircraft sides, so CryptoVerif proves the
correspondences1:
event(recv_Init_REQ(V,U, x , sU, tU, tV)) =⇒
check_time(tU, tV) ∧ event(send_Init_REQ(U,V, x , s′U, tU)).
(9)
event(recv_Init_IND(U,V, x , sV, tV, tU)) =⇒
check_time(tV, tU) ∧ event(send_Init_IND(V,U, x , s′V, tV)).
(10)
For the protocol with replay protection, we assume SUF-CMA signatures. Hence CryptoVerif
proves (7) and (8).
Obviously, for a proper functioning of the protocol, the clocks of the aircraft and of the
ground entity must remain synchronized. An adversary could perform attacks if it managed
to desynchronize these clocks; such attacks are outside the scope of our model. (Using nonces
instead of timestamps could avoid such attacks.)
2) No replay for AMS_Init_REQ and AMS_Init_IND messages. To prove this property, we
need to consider our improved replay protection, since the original protocol does not guarantee
the absence of replays. This property is modeled by injective variants of (7) and (8):
inj-event(recv_Init_REQ(V,U, x , sU, tU, tV)) =⇒
check_time(tU, tV) ∧ inj-event(send_Init_REQ(U,V, x , sU, tU)).
(11)
inj-event(recv_Init_IND(U,V, x , sV, tV, tU)) =⇒
check_time(tV, tU) ∧ inj-event(send_Init_IND(V,U, x , sV, tV)).
(12)
These correspondences guarantee that each reception of the AMS_Init_REQ message on V
corresponds to a distinct emission of that message on U, and similarly for AMS_Init_IND.
Injectivity is enforced by the keyword inj-event.
In ProVerif, we prove these correspondences by combining (7) and (8) with a manual argu-
ment, which relies on the following observation.
Lemma 1. If the correspondence event(e(x,M)) =⇒ φ ∧ event(e′(x,M ′)) holds and event
e(x,M) cannot be executed several times with the same value of x, then the injective correspon-
dence inj-event(e(x,M)) =⇒ φ ∧ inj-event(e′(x,M ′)) also holds.
Proof. If a trace contains n executions of e(x,M), they are e(x,M)σ1, . . . , e(x,M)σn for sub-
stitutions σ1, . . . , σn with pairwise distinct values of xσ1, . . . , xσn. Then, by the correspondence
1For uniformity, we use the ProVerif syntax for all correspondences. The actual syntax in CryptoVerif differs
in minor ways.
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event(e(x,M)) =⇒ φ ∧ event(e′(x,M)), for all i ≤ n, we have that φσi holds and e′(x,M)σi
is executed in this trace. Furthermore, these executions of e′(x,M)σi are distinct for distinct
i, because their arguments xσi are distinct for distinct i. This property proves the injective
correspondence inj-event(e(x,M)) =⇒ φ ∧ inj-event(e′(x,M ′)).
This observation is not new [19, before Corollary 3, page 406]. It obviously remains true when
x and M are replaced with several variables and terms respectively, and when the arguments of
events are reordered.
Our improved replay protection guarantees that the ground entity never accepts two
AMS_Init_REQ messages with the same U, sU, tU. Hence distinct events recv_Init_REQ(V,
U, x , sU, tU, tV) have distinct triples U, sU, tU, so by correspondence (7) and Lemma 1, (11) holds.
The correspondence (12) is proved similarly. Indeed, ProVerif is unable to prove injectivity auto-
matically when it is obtained using a replay cache: injectivity relies on the event recv_Init_REQ
being executed only when a lookup in the replay cache fails. However, in its internal represen-
tation by Horn clauses, ProVerif overapproximates the behaviors and considers that this lookup
may always fail, so the required information is lost.
In contrast, CryptoVerif treats lookup failures precisely, so in CryptoVerif, we model our im-
proved replay check, which guarantees that the AMS_Init_REQ and AMS_Init_IND messages
are never accepted with the same identity, timestamp, and signature. With this improved check,
CryptoVerif shows (11) and (12).
3) Entity authentication. ProVerif and CryptoVerif prove the correspondence (7) or (9), which
proves non-injective authentication of the aircraft to the ground entity. Furthermore, with our
improved replay check, (11) proves injective authentication of the aircraft to the ground entity.
ProVerif and CryptoVerif also prove the correspondence:
inj-event(recv_Init_RSP(U,V, x , sU,RandV, tU,KMACU,V,KENCU,V)) =⇒
check_time(tU, tV) ∧
inj-event(send_Init_RSP(V,U, x , sU,RandV, tU, tV,KMACU,V,KENCU,V)).
(13)
This correspondence means that, if U accepts an AMS_Init_RSP message x from V, then the
message has been sent by V to U, and U and V share the same signature sU, random number
RandV, time tU, MAC key KMACU,V, encryption key KENCU,V, and there is a time tV at which
V received the AMS_Init_REQ message such that check_time(tU, tV), that is, the inequality (2)
holds. Furthermore, since the correspondence is injective (inj-event), each AMS_Init_RSP
message received by U corresponds to a distinct AMS_Init_RSP message sent by V. So (13)
proves authentication of the ground entity to the aircraft.
Hence, these correspondences prove mutual authentication of the aircraft and ground entity.
4) Message authentication. This property is formalized by the following correspondences:
inj-event(recv_msg(x , y , tU, sU,RandV, policy , prot , enc, count ,msg)) =⇒
prot = get_policy(policy ,msg) ∧
(inj-event(send_msg(y , x , tU, sU,RandV, policy , prot , enc, count ,msg)) ∨ prot = NONE)
(14)
where (x , y) is (U,V) or (V,U). These correspondences mean that, for (x , y) equal to (U,V) or
(V,U), if x has received the payload message msg from entity y , protected under the protection
mode prot , and the policy identifier is policy , then the protection mode associated to msg in the
policy policy is prot , and either prot = NONE or the message msg has been sent by y to x with
the same timestamp tU, signature sU, random value RandV, policy policy , protection mode prot ,
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encryption algorithm enc, and counter count on the receiver and sender sides. Furthermore,
when prot 6= NONE, the message has been sent at least as many times as it has been received.
In other words, authenticity and absence of replays of the message are guaranteed when its
associated policy is not NONE.
In ProVerif, since we use the predicate policy_ok instead of the function get_policy (see
Section 2.2 9)), we prove the following correspondences:
event(recv_msg(x, y, tU, sU,RandV, policy , prot , enc, count ,msg)) =⇒
policy_ok(policy , prot ,msg) ∧
policy_ok(policy , prot ′,msg) ∧
(event(send_msg(y, x, tU, sU,RandV, policy , prot ′, enc, count ,msg)) ∨ prot = NONE)
where (x , y) is (U,V) or (V,U), and we infer (14) by combining them with the following manual
argument. Since policy_ok(policy , prot ,msg) holds if and only if prot = get_policy(policy ,msg),
we have prot = prot ′ = get_policy(policy ,msg), so
event(recv_msg(x, y, tU, sU,RandV, policy , prot , enc, count ,msg)) =⇒
prot = get_policy(policy ,msg) ∧
(event(send_msg(y, x, tU, sU,RandV, policy , prot , enc, count ,msg)) ∨ prot = NONE).
(15)
which is a non-injective variant of (14). We prove the absence of replays as follows. By the
message count windowing criteria [2, Table 7.3.1-1, Step D08], the receiver accepts only once a
message with a given count. Moreover, x , y identify the receiver and sender, respectively, and
sU and RandV identify uniquely the session of the aircraft and of the ground entity, respec-
tively. (Since ECDSA signatures are probabilistic, a new signature sU is created at each ses-
sion.) So distinct executions of recv_msg(x , y , tU, sU,RandV, policy , prot , enc, count ,msg) (with
prot 6= NONE) have distinct values of the quintuple x , y , sU,RandV, count . We have (15) and we
prove injectivity as in Lemma 1, distinguishing the cases prot 6= NONE and prot = NONE, so we
obtain (14).
Since the receiver accepts a message with a given count only once, message counter roll-over
must be avoided by ending the session and starting a new secure session when the counter reaches
its maximal value of 255, as mentioned in [2, page 79].
CryptoVerif proves (14) directly.
5) Secrecy of keys. We study the secrecy of the keys KMACU,V and KENCU,V. In the
symbolic model, ProVerif shows that the adversary cannot compute these keys (by showing that
a constant message encrypted under these keys remains secret). In the computational model,
we would like to show that these keys are indistinguishable from fresh independent random keys
at the end of the session initiation. CryptoVerif proves this property for keys KENCU,V. This
property does not hold for KMACU,V, because this key is used in the second message of the
session initiation. This point does not correspond to an attack against the protocol, but it makes
it more difficult to prove security modularly: we cannot show that the session initiation provides
a secure key, and then use this property in the application data exchange.
6) Secrecy of messages. To prove secrecy in ProVerif, we modify our model slightly so that
the payload message is not initially known to the adversary. We define a private function (a
function that cannot be applied by the adversary) msg that we use to build the payload message.
The term msg(U,V, policy , x ) represents a message sent from U to V under the policy policy .
Inria
Symbolic and Computational Mechanized Verification of ARINC823 17
When encryption is supported, ProVerif proves the property:
attacker(msg(U,V, policy , x )) =⇒
policy_ok(policy ,AUTH,msg(U,V, policy , x )) ∨
policy_ok(policy ,NONE,msg(U,V, policy , x )).
(16)
and the symmetric correspondence obtained by swapping U and V. In other words, if the attacker
has the payload message sent from U to V or from V to U, then the policy specifies a protection
AUTH or NONE for this message. So, if the policy specifies a protection BOTH, then the attacker
cannot have the payload message, so this message is secret.
Obviously, when encryption is not supported, the messages cannot be secret. ProVerif con-
firms this point.
In CryptoVerif, we suppose that encryption is supported. CryptoVerif then proves the follow-
ing secrecy property. At the beginning of the protocol, we choose a random bit b with uniform
probability. For each payload message, the sender actually gets two candidate payloads payload0
and payload1 from the adversary. When the current session is between the honest entities U and
V and the two payloads have protection mode BOTH (that is, get_policy(policy , payload0) =
get_policy(policy , payload1) = BOTH), we require that the corresponding encoded and com-
pressed payloads have the same length. Otherwise, we require that payload0 = payload1. The
sender then sends payloadb following the protocol. We show that the random bit b is secret,
that is, the adversary has a probability close to 1/2 of guessing b. So the adversary only has a
negligible probability of distinguishing whether payload0 or payload1 has been sent, which proves
secrecy for messages with associated protection mode BOTH in sessions between U and V.
Although the content of the messages is secret, the length of the encoded and compressed
payload is public, since encryption preserves the length. In some cases, this length may reveal
important information about the underlying message. (See [44] for an attack that relies on the
length of encrypted messages in a different context.) From the point of view of security, it would
be stronger to hide the length of the messages as well, for instance by arranging so that all
messages whose length is within a certain interval encrypt into a ciphertext of the same length,
in the style of the countermeasure proposed in [44]. However, a loss of bandwidth is unavoidable
in this case.
7) Unknown key share attacks. ProVerif and CryptoVerif prove the following correspondence:
event(send_Init_RSP(V,U, x , sU,RandV, tU, tV,KMACU,V,KENCU,V)) ∧
event(recv_Init_RSP(U ′, V ′, x ′, s′U,Rand
′
V, t
′
U,KMAC
′
U,V,KENCU,V)) =⇒ U = U ′ ∧ V = V ′.
(17)
(An encoding is needed in ProVerif because it does not support conjunctions of events on the
left-hand side of the arrow, but the proved correspondence is equivalent to the one above.)
This correspondence shows that, if executions of U and V share the same encryption key, then
U believes he talks to V and conversely. A similar correspondence holds for executions that
share the same MAC key. These correspondences show the absence of unknown key share (UKS)
attacks [26,30]. In these attacks, the aircraft U believes it shares a key with a (possibly dishonest)
ground entity V′ and the ground entity V believes it shares a key with a (possibly dishonest)
aircraft U′ but the two sessions share the same keys, so the adversary can make a message
from U to V′ appear to V as a message from U′, and similarly swapping U and V. (In bilateral
UKS attacks [26], U 6= U′ and V 6= V′; in unilateral UKS attacks [30], U 6= U′ and V = V′ or
symmetrically.)
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8) Forward secrecy of messages. Forward secrecy means that, even if a long-term secret key
is compromised after the protocol is executed, the exchanged messages remain secret. ProVerif
finds an attack against this property. Indeed, if an adversary manages to compromise a secret
key dU or dV even after the session has been terminated, it will be able to compute the shared
keys and decrypt the messages, because the entities always reuse the same secret keys dU and
dV, without including ephemerals in the Diffie-Hellman key agreement. We did not try to prove
forward secrecy in CryptoVerif, since we know that it does not hold from the symbolic analysis.
9) Key compromise impersonation. When the long-term key dU of an aircraft is compro-
mised, we naturally expect that the adversary can impersonate the aircraft to any ground entity.
However, ProVerif finds out that the adversary can also impersonate any ground entity to the
compromised aircraft: it finds an attack against the correspondence (13). This is a key com-
promise impersonation (KCI) attack. To perform this attack, the adversary runs the protocol
exactly as a ground entity, except that it computes ZU,V as dUQV using the compromised secret
key dU of the aircraft and the public key QV of the ground entity, instead of the normal com-
putation of ZU,V = dVQU. Since dUQV = dVQU, the two computations yield the same result.
Furthermore, the computation of ZU,V is the only point at which the secret key dV of the ground
entity is normally used, so the adversary succeeds in impersonating the ground entity.
When the long-term key dV of a ground entity is compromised, ProVerif shows that the
correspondence (7) still holds. Indeed, the protocol requires a signature of the aircraft, so the
adversary cannot fully impersonate an aircraft to the ground entity, because it cannot forge a
signature. However, ProVerif also finds out that the correspondence (15) does not hold when
(x , y) is (U,V): the ground entity may receive messages that seem to come from the aircraft even
though the aircraft never sent them. Indeed, after the first two messages of the protocol, the
adversary can compute ZU,V = dVQU, and from that compute the encryption and MAC keys, so
it can decrypt and forge messages.
We did not try to prove the absence of key compromise impersonation attacks in CryptoVerif,
since we know that it does not hold from the symbolic analysis.
10) Strengthened protocol. Moreover, attacks against these properties are not very serious as
they only appear after the compromise of a long-term key, which is already a serious situation.
However, they make this compromise even more serious.
These attacks can be avoided by using a signed Diffie-Hellman key exchange in which the
long-term keys are used only for signing and Diffie-Hellman exponents are fresh in each session.
Hence, we define a fixed protocol as follows:
Aircraft U Ground entity V
Secure session initiation
AMS_Init_REQ message
m1 = (H1, Init_REQ,Policy ,U,V, RU,Algos, tU)
sU = SIG(dU, (U,V,m1))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
AMS_Init_RSP message
m2 = (H2, Init_RSP+,AlgSel , RV, [certV], tU,RandV)
SIG(dV, (V,U,m2,m1, sU))
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
where eU, RU is a fresh ephemeral private-public key pair for the aircraft and eV, RV is a fresh
ephemeral private-public key pair for the ground entity, and we compute
ZU,V = eVRU = eURV
XU,V = HASH((AlgSel ,Algos, tU, sU,RandV)) .
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The inclusion of m1 in the signature of the AMS_Init_RSP message guarantees that U and V
have common parameters (in particular the ephemeral RU and the algorithms Algos) even when
U’s long-term key is compromised. The addition of AlgSel in the computation of XU,V guarantees
that U and V share the same algorithms even when V’s long-term key is compromised. We could
not fully verify the fixed protocol in ProVerif because it took more than 8 Gb of memory.
Indeed, the protocols verified in this paper are fairly intensive for ProVerif, because there are
many cases. The fixed public key protocol is even more, probably because of the presence of
additional randomness (the ephemerals), which leads to bigger terms. However, we proved using
CryptoVerif that it satisfies all properties we consider in the computational model, which is
stronger than a symbolic proof in ProVerif. The assumptions are the same as for the original
protocol, except that we do not need a joint security assumption between Diffie-Hellman key
agreements and signatures: we use SUF-CMA signatures and the computational Diffie-Hellman
assumption (for most properties) or the stronger gap Diffie-Hellman assumption (for resistance
to KCI attacks when the ground entity is compromised and for forward secrecy; these properties
do not hold under the CDH assumption). Obviously, the stronger security properties come at a
price: the key exchange of the fixed protocol is more costly than the original one, since U and
V have to choose an ephemeral secret key and compute and send the corresponding ephemeral
public key, and a MAC is replaced with a signature.
Another possible way to strengthen the protocol would be to use a triple Diffie-Hellman
exchange, with ephemerals and without signatures, as in Signal [32], for instance. We preferred
using a signed Diffie-Hellman exchange to be closer to the original protocol: the signatures
authenticate the AMS_Init_IND and AMS_Init_REQ messages, as in the original protocol;
that would not be true with a triple Diffie-Hellman exchange.
Honeywell made several comments on our proposal:
• The AMS security protocol is based on the technical provisions and security protocol spec-
ified for the Aeronautical Telecommunications Network (ATN). Although the ATN does
not currently include provisions for confidentiality (encryption), the AMS encryption im-
plementation is consistent with a white paper [25] that was presented to ICAO to demon-
strate extensibility of the ATN security solution to support encryption in the future. The
approach presented in [25] does not consider use of ephemerals.
• The current AMS security protocol is optimized to take into account the bandwidth, com-
putational, and memory constraints of avionic systems.
• Our proposed use of ephemerals would require further assessment in the following areas: the
ability of legacy avionics to generate quality ephemeral key pairs; the impact of increased
overhead to exchange ephemeral public components during secure session initiation; and
the impact on avionics computing performance and memory as a result of more complex
computation of the secret key agreement value (ZU,V).
• With the current AMS security solution, session-specific encryption and authentication
keys are never stored but may be recreated using archived copies of the session initiation
messages plus the static public/private key pair of the ground entity. This may be necessary
to decrypt archived encrypted messages in the event of an accident investigation. The
addition of ephemeral keys would require the ground entity to also archive its public/private
ephemerals (consistent with message retention policy) associated with each secure session.
11) Proof indications. In CryptoVerif, the proofs of the AMS public-key protocol require the
user to give the main proof steps: apply the assumption on the signatures in certificates, use the
random oracle assumption on the concatenation of KDF256 and KDF128, remove assignments on
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Aircraft U Ground entity V
Ground-initiated trigger
AMS_Init_IND message
m0 = (H0, Init_IND,U,V, tV)
mac0,V = MAC(KU,V, (V,U,m0))
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Secure session initiation
AMS_Init_REQ message
m1 = (H1, Init_REQ,Policy ,U,V,Algos, tU)
mac0,U = MAC(KU,V, (U,V,m1))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
AMS_Init_RSP message
m2 = (H2, Init_RSP+,AlgSel , tU,RandV)
MAC(KMACU,V, (V,U,m2,Algos, tU,mac0,U))
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Figure 2: Simplified AMS protocol using a shared key
variable ZU,V in the aircraft process and in the ground entity process to make equality tests such
as m = dVQU appear, use the gap Diffie-Hellman assumption to prove that some of these tests
are false, apply the assumption on signatures under dV and dU, and finally use the automatic
proof strategy to conclude the proof. The proofs for the strengthened protocol use a similar style
of guidance, sometimes with additional case distinctions. We refer the interested reader to the
CryptoVerif scripts for details.
12) Runtime. In total, the analysis of the public-key protocol took 10 h 47 min in ProVerif and
17 min in CryptoVerif. The analysis of the strengthened protocol exhausted memory in ProVerif
and took 1 h 16 min in CryptoVerif on an Intel Xeon 1.2 GHz. In this example, CryptoVerif is
more efficient than ProVerif, probably because ProVerif explores an abstraction of all states of
the protocol, while CryptoVerif performs a proof by game transformation, so it does not need
to explore all these states. The guidance also helps CryptoVerif to be more efficient by avoiding
the exploration of unsuccessful proofs.
3 AMS Protocol using a Shared Key
In this section, we study the AMS protocol using a shared key as defined in [2, Attachment 8].
3.1 Protocol Description
In this protocol, the aircraft and the ground entity initially share a long-term key KU,V. They
establish session keys as shown in Figure 2. The protocol is similar to the public-key protocol (see
Section 2.1), but the AMS_Init_IND and AMS_Init_REQ messages are protected by MACs
under KU,V instead of signatures. The session keys are derived as follows:
XU,V = HASH((Algos, tU,mac0,U,RandV))
and KMACU,V and KENCU,V are computed as in the public-key protocol except that ZU,V
is replaced with KU,V. The application data exchange proceeds exactly as in the public-key
protocol.
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3.2 Modeling Notes
Our comments of Section 2.2 also apply to the shared-key protocol, with the following exceptions:
1) Sessions. Except for unknown key share attacks, the models consider a single aircraft U
and a single ground entity V that share a key KU,V and talk to each other. All other executions
of the protocol are considered as part of the adversary, since they use a different shared key. For
unknown key share attacks, U and V may also talk to dishonest participants, as for the public-key
protocol.
2) Certificates. Section 2.2 3) does not apply, since this protocol does not use certificates.
3) Replay protection. The shared-key protocol uses a replay check similar to the one used by
the public-key protocol, and it suffers from the same weakness. However, the correction is slightly
different, because in the shared-key protocol, the AMS_Init_IND and AMS_Init_REQ mes-
sages do not contain anything random. (In the public-key protocol, they contain a randomized
signature.) Since the timestamp has a 2-second resolution, AMS_Init_IND or AMS_Init_REQ
messages sent within the 2-second interval in which the timestamp does not change are equal.
Hence, the receiver cannot distinguish a replay from a legitimate attempt at starting a session
again within that interval.
To solve this problem, we assume that the aircraft never sends two AMS_Init_REQ messages
to the same ground entity V with the same timestamp tU. (Using a random nonce in addition to
the timestamp tU would guarantee that two sessions never start with the same AMS_Init_REQ
message. However, it is an incompatible change in the protocol.)
Using this assumption, for each aircraft U, the ground entity should remember the timestamp
tU of the last AMS_Init_REQ message received from U, as long as t− 120 seconds ≤ tU where t
is the ground entity’s local time. If the timestamp tU of a new AMS_Init_REQ message received
from U is not strictly more recent than the remembered timestamp tU, the message should be
discarded. (Replays of AMS_Init_REQ messages older than 120 seconds are already discarded
by checking the timestamp.)
Moreover, as for the public-key protocol, the original protocol has no protection against
replays of a ground-initiated trigger (AMS_Init_IND message). To avoid replay attacks, we
recommend protecting against replays of the AMS_Init_IND message by making sure that the
ground entity never sends two AMS_Init_IND messages with the same timestamp tV and using
a check similar to the one mentioned above for the AMS_Init_REQ message.
3.3 Security Assumptions on Primitives
The shared secret key KU,V is used as key both for the MAC and for the key derivation function
KDF. Using the same key for different cryptographic schemes is problematic for proving the
protocol in the computational model: one cannot prove that the protocol is secure under standard
security assumptions, namely that the MAC is SUF-CMA and the key derivation function is a
pseudo-random function (PRF). In this case, one needs a combined security assumption about
the two schemes. (A correction to this problem would be to use the key derivation function
KDF also to derive the key of the MAC in the AMS_Init_IND and AMS_Init_REQ messages.
However, this correction would alter the protocol in an incompatible way.)
To study the protocol in CryptoVerif, we prove that HMAC-SHA256 and the two key deriva-
tion functions KDF256 and KDF128 are indistinguishable from independent pseudo-random func-
tions, even when they use the same key k, in the following two situations:
• when the compression function of SHA256 is a random oracle;
• when the compression function of SHA256 is a pseudo-random function and, given a 256-bit
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Protocols O ST RP
Freshness of AMS_Init_REQ (7) Y Y Y
Freshness of AMS_Init_IND (8) Y Y Y
No replay for AMS_Init_REQ (11) Y
No replay for AMS_Init_IND (12) Y
Non-injective authentication of V to U Y Y Y
Injective authentication of V to U (13) Y Y
Non-injective message authentication (15) Y Y Y
Injective message authentication (14) Y Y
Secrecy of KMACU,V PV PV PV
Secrecy of KENCU,V PV Y Y
Secrecy of messages PV Y Y
No unknown key share attacks (17) Y Y Y
Figure 3: Analysis of the shared-key protocol
random key k,
SHA256_comp(SHA256_init, k ⊕ opad) and
SHA256_comp(SHA256_init, k ⊕ ipad)
are independent pseudo-random bitstrings, and the function
x 7→ SHA256_comp(SHA256_init, k‖x)
is a pseudo-random function independent from those two bitstrings. (SHA256_comp is
the compression function of SHA256, SHA256_init is the initial value for SHA256 given
in [41, Section 5.3.2], ⊕ is exclusive or, opad and ipad are distinct fixed 512-bits constants
consisting of 64 copies of the bytes 0x5C and 0x36 respectively [42], x is 256-bit long, ‖ is
bitstring concatenation.)
The first assumption is very strong, but standard. The second assumption is not so strong but
less standard. It still seems reasonable. The second result generalizes the proof that HMAC is a
PRF given in [9]. These two results are proved using CryptoVerif, as detailed in Appendix D.
Knowing that HMAC-SHA256, KDF256, and KDF128 are independent PRFs (even when they
use the same key), we show that
• HMAC-SHA256 is SUF-CMA, and KDF256 and KDF128 are independent PRFs (even when
they use the same key). This result generalizes the well-known result that a PRF is an
SUF-CMAMAC [10, Section 2.4]. It is proved using CryptoVerif as detailed in Appendix E.
• HMAC-SHA256 has the following collision-resistance property: when the key k is used
only for MAC queries, MAC(k,m1) = MAC(k,m2) implies m1 = m2 with overwhelming
probability, where MAC is HMAC-SHA256. This result is proved using CryptoVerif as
detailed in Appendix F.
• The truncation of HMAC-SHA256 (to 32, 64, and 128 bits, as used in the protocol) is also
an SUF-CMA MAC. This result holds because the truncation of a PRF is also a PRF, and
a PRF is an SUF-CMA MAC.
We use these properties in the proof of protocol. We also assume that SHA256 is collision-
resistant and we make the same assumption on the AES128-CFB128 encryption scheme as in
the public-key protocol.
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3.4 Security Analysis
Much like for the public-key protocol, we use ProVerif and CryptoVerif to verify the security
properties of the protocol. For this protocol, CryptoVerif concludes without user guidance.
Our results are summarized in Figure 3. We refer to correspondences used for the public-key
protocol in this figure; still, the correspondences used for the shared-key protocol differ in that
the arguments sU and sV are omitted from events and in (7), (8), (11), and (12), the argument
x contains the AMS_Init_IND or AMS_Init_REQ message including the MAC.
The authentication of U to V does not appear in the figure as it corresponds to the freshness
and absence of replays for AMS_Init_REQ. The non-injective authentication of V to U is mod-
eled by a non-injective variant of (13). A shared-key protocol cannot provide forward-secrecy nor
protect against key compromise impersonation: the compromise of KU,V allows the adversary to
compute all keys, decrypt all messages, and impersonate participants from both sides. So we do
not test these properties.
In Figure 3, we consider three variants of the protocol: the original protocol (O), the protocol
with the additional assumption that the aircraft never sends two AMS_Init_REQ messages
with the same V and tU (ST, for “Single Timestamp”), and the protocol with our improved
replay protection (RP). We write Y (Yes) when the property is proved both by ProVerif and
CryptoVerif (using manual arguments for proving injectivity in ProVerif as for the public-key
protocol), and PV when it is proved only by ProVerif.
To obtain absence of unknown key share attacks in CryptoVerif, we had to assume that
KDF256 and KDF128 are independent random oracles, as for the public-key protocol. In the
computational model, KMACU,V is not secret, that is, it is distinguishable from random, because
it is used in the AMS_Init_RSP message, as in the public-key protocol.
All other properties that do not hold are due to replay attacks. As discussed in Section 3.2 3),
absence of replays for AMS_Init_REQ and AMS_Init_IND messages holds only with our im-
proved protection against replays. Furthermore, consider the following scenario shown in Fig-
ure 4. The aircraft U and the ground entity V first run a secure session. In the 2-second
interval during which the timestamp remains the same, the aircraft starts a new secure session
with V with the same tU, so exactly the same AMS_Init_REQ message. (This scenario is not
entirely unrealistic since, in case the first session has been triggered by an AMS_Init_IND mes-
sage from the ground entity, the adversary can force such a secure session restart by replaying
the AMS_Init_IND message as mentioned in Section 2.2 6).) The adversary intercepts this
AMS_Init_REQ message and replies by replaying the AMS_Init_RSP message of the first ses-
sion. This message is accepted by the aircraft, so that the aircraft executes event recv_Init_RSP
twice, while the ground entity executes event send_Init_RSP once. This point breaks injective
authentication of V to U. The established sessions keys are the same in both sessions, which
breaks secrecy of KENCU,V in the computational model: indeed, the keys KENCU,V are each
indistinguishable from random, but they are not independent of each other, which we require
for computational secrecy. Furthermore, since the keys are equal, application data messages of
the first session can be replayed in the second one, which breaks injective message authentica-
tion. Finally, if the aircraft sends encrypted data in this second session, the adversary can break
secrecy of messages in the computational model, as follows.
In both sessions, for the n-th message sent by the aircraft, the IV data is IVdata(n) =
(0x00‖n‖zero-pad-bits), so the IV is also the same in both sessions:
IV (n) = E(KENCU,V, 0; IVdata(n)) .
Suppose that the k-th block of plaintext (that is, encoded and compressed payload) of the n-th
message sent by the aircraft in the first session is Pk, and in the second session P ′k. Similarly, let
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Aircraft U Ground entity V
Adversary
AMS_Init_REQ (tU)
AMS_Init_RSP
encrypted data
AMS_Init_REQ (tU)
AMS_Init_RSP (replayed)
encrypted data’
less than
2 seconds
Figure 4: Replay attack
Ck be the k-th block of ciphertext of the n-th message sent by the aircraft in the first session,
and C ′k in the second session. By definition of AES128-CFB128,
C1 = P1 ⊕ AES128(KENCU,V, IV (n)) and
C ′1 = P
′
1 ⊕ AES128(KENCU,V, IV (n))
so C1 ⊕ C ′1 = P1 ⊕ P ′1. The adversary knows C1 and C ′1, so it can compute C1 ⊕ C ′1 and thus
obtain P1 ⊕ P ′1. This is already a breach of secrecy, as the adversary obtains the exclusive or of
two blocks of plaintext. In case C1 6= C ′1, that is, P1 ⊕ P ′1 6= 0, the attack stops here because
C2 = P2 ⊕ AES128(KENCU,V, C1)
C ′2 = P
′
2 ⊕ AES128(KENCU,V, C ′1)
so P2 and P ′2 are xor-ed with different encryptions. However, in case C1 = C ′1, that is, P1 ⊕
P ′1 = 0, the attack continues until a block differs: if for all j < k, Pj = P ′j , then for all
j < k, Cj = C ′j by an easy induction on j since Cj = Pj ⊕ AES128(KENCU,V, Cj−1) = P ′j ⊕
AES128(KENCU,V, C
′
j−1) = C
′
j , and
Ck = Pk ⊕ AES128(KENCU,V, Ck−1)
C ′k = P
′
k ⊕ AES128(KENCU,V, C ′k−1)
= P ′k ⊕ AES128(KENCU,V, Ck−1)
so Ck ⊕ C ′k = Pk ⊕ P ′k, which can be computed by the adversary. Hence, the adversary can test
whether the n-th encrypted message sent by the aircraft in the second session is the same as the
corresponding message of the first session, and in case these messages differ, it gets the exclusive
or of the first blocks of plaintext that differ. This attack does not appear in the symbolic model,
both because the symbolic model ignores the details of the encryption algorithm and because we
verified a weaker secrecy property: we showed that the adversary cannot recover the plaintext.
Therefore, replays may have more serious consequences in the shared-key protocol than in the
public-key protocol. The analysis of the shared-key protocol took 8 min in ProVerif and 11 min
in CryptoVerif on an Intel Xeon 1.2 GHz.
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4 Conclusion
Our study confirms the main security properties of the public-key protocol: authentication and
secrecy of the messages (provided messages are not sent in the clear due to the failure of secure
session initiation). It leads to several recommendations for changes in the ARINC823 standard:
fix the timestamp verification formula (1); make explicit the treatment of the MAC length
received by the aircraft; make explicit the policy check for received messages; discuss the security
risks associated to sending messages in the clear when the secure session initiation fails, and their
possible mitigations; strengthen the replay protection. The last point is especially important for
the shared-key protocol, in which replays may lead to secrecy breaches and replays of application
data messages. We designed a strengthened public-key protocol, which satisfies forward secrecy,
protects against key compromise impersonation attacks, and avoids sharing keys between several
cryptographic primitives.
This case study also illustrates the complementarity between symbolic and computational
verification. ProVerif allows us to easily find most attacks, but the attack against secrecy in the
shared-key protocol does not appear at the symbolic level, and was discovered due to the failure
of a proof in CryptoVerif. The computational analysis provides stronger security guarantees,
but is also more difficult. The high level of automation of CryptoVerif was very helpful for
that analysis, even if a bit of guidance was needed for the proofs of the public-key protocol.
CryptoVerif came to the rescue in cases that exceeded ProVerif’s capabilities (dealing with some
equations; analyzing our strengthened protocol).
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!nanew a : Z; (
OA() := exp(g, a),
!naDDH ODDHa(m : G, j ≤ nb) := m = exp(g,mult(b[j], a))),
!nbnew b : Z; (
OB() := exp(g, b),
!nbDDH ODDHb(m : G, j ≤ na) := m = exp(g,mult(a[j], b)))
≈
!nanew a : Z; (
OA() := exp(g, a),
!naDDH ODDHa(m : G, j ≤ nb) := false),
!nbnew b : Z; (
OB() := exp(g, b),
!nbDDH ODDHb(m : G, j ≤ na) := false).
Figure 5: Formalization of the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption
Appendices
A Joint Assumption on Diffie-Hellman and Signatures
CryptoVerif provides a fairly flexible language for modeling security assumptions on crypto-
graphic primitives, by giving indistinguishability axioms L ≈ R, which mean that L is indistin-
guishable from R. CryptoVerif uses these axioms to provide a game transformation: it replaces
the left-hand side L with the right-hand side R.
In this appendix, we explain the formalization of the joint security assumption of gap Diffie-
Hellman and SUF-CMA signatures in this language. (The case of Diffie-Hellman and UF-CMA
signatures is similar.) We start by recalling the formalization of the computational Diffie-Hellman
assumption, given in Figure 5. In this formalization, Z is the set of exponents (that is, Zp) and
G is the Diffie-Hellman group. The function exp represents exponentiation: exp(g, a) stands for
ga, for g ∈ G and a ∈ Z. The function mult is the product of exponents. The construct !nQ
represents n copies of Q, and new a : Z chooses a fresh random number a uniformly in Z. In
the left-hand side, we generate na random exponents a and nb random exponents b, and we
provide several oracles: OA returns the public Diffie-Hellman value ga, ODDHa(m, j) can be
called naDDH times and returns true if and only if m = gb[j].a (b[j] denotes the j-th exponent
b); OB and ODDHb are similar for b. By the CDH assumption, the adversary cannot compute
ga.b for any of the exponents a and b (except in cases of negligible probability), so it cannot
find m such that m = ga.b, hence the oracles ODDHa and ODDHb return false. We express this
property by replacing the result of ODDHa and ODDHb with false in the right-hand side of the
indistinguishability property. The rest is left unchanged.
The GDH assumption says that CDH still holds in case the adversary has access to a deci-
sional Diffie-Hellman oracle DDH(G,A,B,C) that returns true if and only if there exist a and
b such that A = Ga, B = Gb, C = Gab. We formalize the GDH assumption (Figure 6, ig-
noring the oracles Osigna, Osigna′, Osignb, Osignb′) by additionally giving such oracles to the
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!nanew a : Z; (
OA() := exp(g, a),
!naDDH1ODDHa1(m : G,m′ : G) := m = exp(m′, a),
!naDDH2ODDHa2(m : G,m′ : G, j ≤ nb) := exp(m, b[j]) = exp(m′, a),
!naDDH3ODDHa3(m : G,m′ : G, j ≤ na) := exp(m, a[j]) = exp(m′, a),
!naDDH ODDHa(m : G, j ≤ nb) := m = exp(g,mult(b[j], a)),
!naSnew r : seed;Osigna(m : bitstring) := sign(a,m, r),
!naS
′
new r : seed;Osigna′(m : bitstring) := sign′(a,m, r)),
!nbnew b : Z; (
OB() := exp(g, b),
!nbDDH1ODDHb1(m : G,m′ : G) := m = exp(m′, b),
!nbDDH2ODDHb2(m : G,m′ : G, j ≤ nb) := exp(m, b[j]) = exp(m′, b),
!nbDDH3ODDHb3(m : G,m′ : G, j ≤ na) := exp(m, a[j]) = exp(m′, b),
!nbDDH ODDHb(m : G, j ≤ na) := m = exp(g,mult(a[j], b)),
!nbSnew r : seed;Osignb(m : bitstring) := sign(b,m, r),
!nbS
′
new r : seed;Osignb′(m : bitstring) := sign′(b,m, r))
≈
!nanew a : Z; (
OA() := exp(g, a),
!naDDH1ODDHa1(m : G,m′ : G) := m = exp(m′, a),
!naDDH2ODDHa2(m : G,m′ : G, j ≤ nb) := exp(m, b[j]) = exp(m′, a),
!naDDH3ODDHa3(m : G,m′ : G, j ≤ na) := exp(m, a[j]) = exp(m′, a),
!naDDH ODDHa(m : G, j ≤ nb) := false,
!naSnew r : seed;Osigna(m : bitstring) := sign(a,m, r),
!naS
′
new r : seed;Osigna′(m : bitstring) := sign′(a,m, r)),
!nbnew b : Z; (
OB() := exp(g, b),
!nbDDH1ODDHb1(m : G,m′ : G) := m = exp(m′, b),
!nbDDH2ODDHb2(m : G,m′ : G, j ≤ nb) := exp(m, b[j]) = exp(m′, b),
!nbDDH3ODDHb3(m : G,m′ : G, j ≤ na) := exp(m, a[j]) = exp(m′, b),
!nbDDH ODDHb(m : G, j ≤ na) := false,
!nbSnew r : seed;Osignb(m : bitstring) := sign(b,m, r),
!nbS
′
new r : seed;Osignb′(m : bitstring) := sign′(b,m, r)).
Figure 6: Formalization of the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption, with additional signature
oracles
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!N3new r : Z; (Opk() := exp(g, r),
!N2newr2 : seed;Osign(x : bitstring) := sign(r, x, r2 ),
!N Ocheck(m1 : bitstring, si1 : signature) := ver(exp(g, r), si1 ,m1 ),
!NDDH1ODDH1(m2 : G,m3 : G) := m2 = exp(m3 , r),
!NDDH2ODDH2(m2 : G,m3 : Z) := m2 = exp(g,mult(m3 , r)),
!NDDH3ODDH3(m2 : G) := m2 = exp(g,mult(r, r))),
!N4Ocheck2(m : bitstring, y : G, si : signature) := ver(y, si,m)
≈
!N3new r : Z; (Opk() := exp(g, r),
!N2new r2 : seed;Osign(x : bitstring) := let s : signature = sign′(r, x, r2 ) in s,
!N Ocheck(m1 : bitstring, si1 : signature) :=
find j ≤ N2 suchthat defined(x[j], s[j]) ∧m1 = x[j] ∧ si1 = s[j] then true else false,
!NDDH1ODDH1(m2 : G,m3 : G) := m2 = exp(m3 , r),
!NDDH2ODDH2(m2 : G,m3 : Z) := m2 = exp(g,mult(m3 , r)),
!NDDH3ODDH3(m2 : G) := m2 = exp(g,mult(r, r))),
!N4Ocheck2(m : bitstring, y : G, si : signature) :=
find j ≤ N2 , k ≤ N3 suchthat defined(x[j, k], s[j, k], r[k]) ∧ y = exp(g, r[k]) ∧
m = x[j, k] ∧ si = s[j, k] then true else
find k ≤ N3 suchthat defined(r[k]) ∧ y = exp(g, r[k]) then false else
ver(y, si,m).
Figure 7: Formalization of SUF-CMA signatures, with additional Diffie-Hellman oracles
adversary: ODDHa1(m,m′) corresponds to the decisional Diffie-Hellman oracle DDH(g, ga,m′,
m), ODDHa2(m,m′, j) is DDH(ga, gb[j],m,m′), and ODDHa3(m,m′, j) is DDH(ga, ga[j],m,m′);
ODDHb1, ODDHb2, and ODDHb3 are similar. These oracles are left unchanged in the right-hand
side of the indistinguishability property.
In the full formalization in CryptoVerif, additional variants of the decisional Diffie-Hellman
oracles are given, which encode particular cases in which m′ is of the form gb[j] (or ga[j]). In
this case, m′a reduces to gb[j].a and the oracle must be written in the latter form, otherwise
CryptoVerif will not recognize that it can use the oracle to compute gb[j].a.
The novel point is that, in the particular case of the considered protocol, we need a joint
security assumption with signatures, so we add signature oracles using the keys a and b to this
definition, oracles Osigna, Osigna′, Osignb, Osignb′ in Figure 6. These oracles use both symbol sign
and symbol sign′ for signatures because the game transformation for signatures (shown below)
transforms sign into sign′. These signature oracles are left unchanged in the GDH transformation.
CryptoVerif also supports giving some a’s and b’s to the adversary. Obviously, the CDH
assumption is not applied to m = gab for such a’s and b’s. We do not formalize that here, since
it is not necessary for the considered protocol.
Similarly, the assumption on signatures (Figure 7) includes Diffie-Hellman oracles that are
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left unchanged. It also differs from the standard formalization of signatures in CryptoVerif in
that the private/public key pair is a Diffie-Hellman key pair. In detail, the left-hand side first
chooses a private key r, then it provides several oracles: Opk returns the corresponding public
key, Osign returns the signature of a message, Ocheck verifies a signature, ODDH1,. . . , ODDH3
are the Diffie-Hellman oracles which allow the adversary to compute exponentiations using r,
and finally Ocheck2 is a signature verification oracle which may use any key, not only the public
key exp(g, r) corresponding to r. The right-hand side provides the same oracles, but modifies
the signature verification oracles: when they verify signatures under exp(g, r), they return true if
and only if the candidate message-signature pair comes from the signature oracle. Additionally,
the signature symbol sign is replaced with sign′ in Osign; this trick prevents CryptoVerif from
repeatedly applying the transformation of the left-hand side into the right-hand side to the same
signatures.
B KDF256 and KDF128 are Independent Random Oracles
We assume that the compression function of SHA256 is a random oracle, and show that KDF256
and KDF128 are indifferentiable [27] from independent random oracles. The function SHA256
is used with arguments that have a fixed length by KDF256 and KDF128, so SHA256 (for that
fixed length) is indifferentiable from a random oracle, as a particular case of the prefix-free
Merkle-Damgård construction [27].
We have KDF256(k, (X ,U ,V )) = Hash1 where
SharedInfoMAC ← concatSI(1,HMAC-SHA256,X ,U ,V , 256)
Hash1 ← SHA256(concatKDF(k , 1,SharedInfoMAC ))
and KDF128(k, (X ,U ,V )) = truncate128(Hash1 ′) where
SharedInfoENC ← concatSI(2,AES128-CFB128,X ,U ,V , 128)
Hash1 ′ ← SHA256(concatKDF(k , 1,SharedInfoENC ))
where concatSI and concatKDF are concatenation functions and truncate128 truncates its input
to 128 bits. The two calls to SHA256 have disjoint domains, since the first argument of concatSI
differs, so they are indifferentiable from independent random oracles. Furthermore, the trunca-
tion of a random oracle is indifferentiable from a random oracle, so KDF256 and KDF128 are
indifferentiable from independent random oracles. The concatenation of two independent random
oracles is indifferentiable from a random oracle, so the concatenation of KDF256 and KDF128 is
indifferentiable from a random oracle.
C Proof of Indistinguishability for Encryption
Our goal is to show that the probability of distinguishing game (5) from the game (6) is at
most the probability of event repeatedIV plus a negligible probability. (These games are given in
Section 2.3.) We introduce the following intermediate game
Ogen() := k
R← enc_key; return(); foreach i ≤ n do
Oenc(IVdata,m) :=
find j ≤ n suchthat defined(IVdata[j]) ∧ IVdata = IVdata[j]
then event repeatedIV else return(ENC(k, IVdata,m))
(18)
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Ogen() :=
k
R← enc_key;
IV0 : blocksize← AES(k ,Zero);
return();
(
Oenc1(IVdata1 : blocksize,m1 : blocksize, l : len) :=
if defined(IVdata2 ) ∧ IVdata1 = IVdata2 then event repeatedIV else
if defined(IVdata3 ) ∧ IVdata1 = IVdata3 then event repeatedIV else
IV1 ← xor(IV0 , IVdata1 );
c1 ← xor(AES(k , IV1 ),m1 );
return(truncate(c1 , l))
) | (
Oenc2(IVdata2 : blocksize,m21 : blocksize,m22 : blocksize, l : len) :=
if defined(IVdata1 ) ∧ IVdata2 = IVdata1 then event repeatedIV else
if defined(IVdata3 ) ∧ IVdata2 = IVdata3 then event repeatedIV else
IV2 ← xor(IV0 , IVdata2 );
c21 ← xor(AES(k , IV2 ),m21 );
c22 ← xor(AES(k , c21 ),m22 );
return(c21 , truncate(c22 , l))
) | (
Oenc3(IVdata3 : blocksize,m31 : blocksize,m32 : blocksize,m33 : blocksize, l : len) :=
if defined(IVdata1 ) ∧ IVdata3 = IVdata1 then event repeatedIV else
if defined(IVdata2 ) ∧ IVdata3 = IVdata2 then event repeatedIV else
IV3 ← xor(IV0 , IVdata3 );
c31 ← xor(AES(k , IV3 ),m31 );
c32 ← xor(AES(k , c31 ),m32 );
c33 ← xor(AES(k , c32 ),m33 );
return(c31 , c32 , truncate(c33 , l))
)
Figure 8: Encryption: initial game
This game executes event repeatedIV when IVdata has been previously used, and otherwise
encrypts m. Let us explain this game in more detail. The foreach construct allows one to call
the following oracle Oenc at most n times. In CryptoVerif, all variables defined under foreach
are implicitly arrays indexed by the index of foreach. In particular, the argument IVdata of
Oenc is an array IVdata[i], which contains the IV data of all previous queries to Oenc. The find
construct find j ≤ n suchthat defined(vars) ∧ cond then P else P ′ looks for an index j ≤ q
such that the variables in vars are defined and the condition cond holds. When such an index
is found, the process P is executed with that index; otherwise, the process Q is executed. In
the case of Oenc, the find construct looks for a previous query to Oenc, with index j such that
its argument IVdata[j] is the same as the current argument IVdata. When it is found, that is,
when IVdata has been previously used, it executes event repeatedIV; otherwise, it returns the
encryption of m.
The probability of distinguishing (5) from (18) is the probability of event repeatedIV. It just
remains to show that (18) is indistinguishable from (6). CryptoVerif cannot fully show this result,
because it lacks looping capabilities. In this appendix, we show this result on an example with
3 messages, containing respectively 1, 2, and 3 blocks. The proof starts from the initial game
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Ogen() := return();
(
Oenc1(IVdata1 : blocksize,m1 : blocksize, l : len) :=
if defined(IVdata2 ) ∧ IVdata1 = IVdata2 then event repeatedIV else
if defined(IVdata3 ) ∧ IVdata1 = IVdata3 then event repeatedIV else
r69
R← blocksize;
return(truncate(r69, l))
) | (
Oenc2(IVdata2 : blocksize,m21 : blocksize,m22 : blocksize, l : len) :=
if defined(IVdata1 ) ∧ IVdata2 = IVdata1 then event repeatedIV else
if defined(IVdata3 ) ∧ IVdata2 = IVdata3 then event repeatedIV else
r67
R← blocksize;
r65
R← blocksize;
return(r67, truncate(r65, l))
) | (
Oenc3(IVdata3 : blocksize,m31 : blocksize,m32 : blocksize,m33 : blocksize, l : len) :=
if defined(IVdata1 ) ∧ IVdata3 = IVdata1 then event repeatedIV else
if defined(IVdata2 ) ∧ IVdata3 = IVdata2 then event repeatedIV else
r63
R← blocksize;
r61
R← blocksize;
r59
R← blocksize;
return(r63, r61, truncate(r59, l))
)
Figure 9: Encryption: final game
shown in Figure 8, which is the instance of game (18) corresponding to the example we consider.
In this game, IVdata1 , IVdata2 , and IVdata3 are guaranteed to be pairwise distinct: in case
they are not, the encryption oracles terminate with the event repeatedIV. AES is assumed to be
a pseudo-random permutation. Each message consists of a certain number of 128-bits blocks; the
last block may be partially used. The encryption oracles in the game above take as argument
the blocks of the message as well as the length of the useful part of the last block.
CryptoVerif automatically transforms this game into the game of Figure 9. We can notice that
this game does not depend on the actual content of the message blocks (m1 , m21 , m22 , . . . ) but
only on the length of the blocks: the ciphertext is a random bitstring of the same length as the
plaintext. Therefore, we can apply the same game transformation to the game that encrypts zero-
blocks instead of the real message (as in game (6)), and we are going to obtain exactly the same
final game. Hence, the initial game in which the encrypt the real messages is indistinguishable
from the game in which we encrypt zero-blocks (with overwhelming probability).
D HMAC-SHA256, KDF256, and KDF128 are Independent
PRFs
We first prove that HMAC-SHA256, KDF256, and KDF128 are independent PRFs when the
compression function of SHA256 is a pseudo-random function and, given a 256-bit random key
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Ogen() := k
R← mac_key; return();
(
foreach i ≤ qMAC do
O_MAC(m : bitstring) :=
K0 ← padkey(k);
return(SHA256_comp(SHA256_comp(SHA256_init, xor(K0 , opad)),
padsha256_2(SHA256_comp_star(SHA256_comp(SHA256_init, xor(K0 , ipad)),
padsha256(m)))))
) | (
foreach i ≤ qKDF256 do
O_KDF256(X2 : t_SHA256_out,U2 : t_id,V2 : t_id) :=
SharedInfoMAC ← concatSI(MACcst,HMAC_SHA256num,X2 ,U2 ,V2 ,HMAC256keylength);
Hash1 ← SHA256_KDF(concatKDF(k , count1,SharedInfoMAC ));
return(Hash1 )
) | (
foreach i ≤ qKDF128 do
O_KDF128(X3 : t_SHA256_out,U3 : t_id,V3 : t_id) :=
SharedInfoENC ← concatSI(ENCcst,AES128num,X3 ,U3 ,V3 ,AES128keylength);
Hash1 ← SHA256_KDF(concatKDF(k , count1,SharedInfoENC ));
return(truncate128(Hash1 ))
)
Figure 10: MAC and key derivation: initial game
k, SHA256_comp(SHA256_init, k ⊕ opad) and SHA256_comp(SHA256_init, k ⊕ ipad) are inde-
pendent pseudo-random bitstrings, and the function x 7→ SHA256_comp(SHA256_init, k‖x) is
a pseudo-random function independent from those two bitstrings. This proof starts from the
initial game shown in Figure 10. This game first defines an oracle Ogen, which generates the key
k used by HMAC-SHA256, KDF256, and KDF128. Then it returns control to the adversary and
makes available 3 oracles: O_MAC computes HMAC-SHA256, O_KDF256 computes KDF256,
and O_KDF128 computes KDF128. All these oracles can be called several times, as defined
by the foreach construct; for instance, O_MAC can be called at most qMAC times. We make
explicit that the hash function SHA256 is built from the compression function SHA256_comp
using the Merkle-Damgård construction [29]. In particular, the function SHA256_KDF computes
SHA256 for a message that consists of two blocks, as follows:
SHA256_KDF(x : t_SHA256_KDF_in) =
SHA256_comp(SHA256_comp(SHA256_init, first_block(x)), second_block(x))
The key derivation functions KDF128 and KDF256 call SHA256 only with messages that consist
of two blocks. In the same line, SHA256_comp_star is the iteration of SHA256_comp for any
number of blocks. This game uses the following constants: MACcst = 1 and ENCcst = 2 are
used in order to distinguish the information for generating MAC keys from the one for gener-
ating encryption keys; HMAC_SHA256num = 0xF1 designates the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm;
AES128num = 0x01 designates the AES128-CFB128 algorithm; HMAC256keylength = 256 is the
length of keys for HMAC-SHA256; AES128keylength = 128 is the length of keys for AES128-
CFB128; count1 = 1 and count2 = 2 are two values of a counter.
Using the assumptions on the SHA256 compression function, and guided by proof indications,
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Ogen() := return();
(
foreach i ≤ qMAC do
O_MAC(m : bitstring) :=
find [unique] j1 = j
′
1 ≤ qMAC suchthat defined(m[j′1], r1[j′1]) ∧ (m = m[j′1]) then
return(r1[j1])
else
r1
R← t_SHA256_out; return(r1)
) | (
foreach i ≤ qKDF256 do
O_KDF256(X2 : t_SHA256_out,U2 : t_id,V2 : t_id) :=
find [unique] j2 = j
′
2 ≤ qKDF256 suchthat defined(X2 [j′2],U2 [j′2],V2 [j′2], r2[j′2]) ∧
(X2 = X2 [j′2]) ∧ (U2 = U2 [j′2]) ∧ (V2 = V2 [j′2]) then
return(r2[j2])
else
r2
R← mac_key; return(r2)
) | (
foreach i ≤ qKDF128 do
O_KDF128(X3 : t_SHA256_out,U3 : t_id,V3 : t_id) :=
find [unique] j3 = j
′
3 ≤ qKDF128 suchthat defined(X3 [j′3],U3 [j′3],V3 [j′3], r3[j′3]) ∧
(X3 = X3 [j′3]) ∧ (U3 = U3 [j′3]) ∧ (V3 = V3 [j′3]) then
return(r3[j3])
else
r3
R← enc_key; return(r3)
)
Figure 11: MAC and key derivation: final game
CryptoVerif transforms this initial game into the final game of Figure 11. (We renumbered some
variables for readability.)
Hence, CryptoVerif proves that this final game is indistinguishable from the initial game (with
overwhelming probability). This final game includes the same oracles as the initial game, but now
O_MAC, O_KDF256, and O_KDF128 are independent pseudo-random functions. Consider for
example the oracle O_MAC. In CryptoVerif, all variables defined under foreach are implicitly
arrays indexed by the index of foreach. So the argument m of O_MAC is an array m[i], which
contains the arguments of all previous queries to O_MAC. The find construct find j = j′ ≤
q suchthat defined(vars)∧cond then P else P ′ looks for an index j′ ≤ q such that the variables
in vars are defined and the condition cond holds. When such an index is found, it is stored in j
and the process P is executed; otherwise, the process Q is executed. In the case of O_MAC, the
find construct looks for a previous query to O_MAC, with index j′1 such that its argument m[j′1]
is the same as the current argument m. When it is found, it returns the previously returned
result r1[j1]; otherwise, it generates a fresh random number r1 and returns it. This is exactly
the definition of a pseudo-random function: it returns a random output on a fresh query and the
previously returned result when the query has already been asked. The situation is similar for
O_KDF256 and O_KDF128.
So CryptoVerif has proved that HMAC-SHA256, KDF256, and KDF128 are indistinguishable
from independent pseudo-random functions (with overwhelming probability).
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Ostart() := hk1
R← hashkey1; return();
(
foreach i2 ≤ N2 do
Ogen() := k
R← mac_key; return();
(
O1() := return(SHA256_comp(hk1 ,SHA256_initxor(padkey(k), opad)))
|
O2() := return(SHA256_comp(hk1 ,SHA256_init, xor(padkey(k), ipad)))
|
foreach i ≤ N do
O3(x : mac_key) := return(SHA256_comp(hk1 ,SHA256_init, concatSHA256(k , x )))
)
) | (
foreach i1 ≤ N1 do
OH(x1 : t_SHA256_out, x2 : t_SHA256_block) := return(SHA256_comp(hk1 , x1 , x2 ))
)
Figure 12: PRF properties of the compression function of SHA-256: initial game
Next, we prove that HMAC-SHA256, KDF256, and KDF128 are independent PRFs when the
compression function of SHA256 is a random oracle. For this proof, we rely on the previous
result. A random oracle is a fortiori a pseudo-random function, so we just have to prove that,
given a 256-bit random key k,
SHA256_comp(SHA256_init, k ⊕ opad) and
SHA256_comp(SHA256_init, k ⊕ ipad)
are independent pseudo-random bitstrings, and the function
x 7→ SHA256_comp(SHA256_init, k‖x)
is a pseudo-random function independent from those two bitstrings. This proof starts from the
initial game shown in Figure 12. This game chooses N2 keys k and defines oracles O1 which re-
turns SHA256_comp(SHA256_init, k⊕opad), O2 which returns SHA256_comp(SHA256_init, k⊕
ipad), and O3 which maps x to SHA256_comp(SHA256_init, k‖x). It also defines a random ora-
cle for SHA256_comp (oracle OH). The function SHA256_comp takes as argument an additional
key, chosen at the beginning of the game. This key models the choice of the random oracle itself.
Under the assumption that SHA256_comp is a random oracle, CryptoVerif automatically
transforms this game into the final game shown in Figure 13. (We renumbered some variables
for readability.) This game defines the same oracles as the initial game, but now O1 and O2
return a fresh random number, O3 is a pseudo-random function, OH is still a random oracle. (Its
code is expanded into a function that returns the previous result when the argument has already
been seen and a fresh random number otherwise.)
CryptoVerif proves that this final game is indistinguishable from the initial game (with over-
whelming probability), which is the desired result.
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Ostart() := return();
(
foreach i2 ≤ N2 do
Ogen() := k
R← mac_key; return();
(
O1() := r1
R← t_SHA256_out; return(r1)
|
O2() := r2
R← t_SHA256_out; return(r2)
|
foreach i ≤ N do
O3(x : mac_key) :=
find [unique] j3 = j
′
3 ≤ N suchthat defined(r3[j′3], x [j′3]) ∧ (x = x [j′3]) then
return(r3[j3])
else
r3
R← t_SHA256_out; return(r3)
)
) | (
foreach i1 ≤ N1 do
OH(x1 : t_SHA256_out, x2 : t_SHA256_block) :=
find [unique] j4 = j
′
4 ≤ N1 suchthat
defined(r4[j
′
4], x2 [j
′
4], x1 [j
′
4]) ∧ (x1 = x1 [j′4]) ∧ (x2 = x2 [j′4]) then
return(r4[j4])
else
r4
R← t_SHA256_out; return(r4)
)
Figure 13: PRF properties of the compression function of SHA-256: final game
E HMAC-SHA256 is SUF-CMA, and KDF256 and KDF128
are Independent PRFs
Our goal is to show that the game G1 shown in Figure 14 is indistinguishable from the game
G2 shown in the same figure (with overwhelming probability) using the assumption that MAC,
KDF256, and KDF128 are independent pseudo-random functions, as shown in Appendix D from
two different assumptions.
The game G1 defines an oracle Ogen that generates the key k, and then provides 4 oracles,
for computing a MAC, for verifying a MAC, and for computing KDF256 and KDF128. In game
G2, we have the same oracles, but the MAC verification oracle O_Ver additionally checks that
the message is in the array of messages m[j′] whose MAC has been previously computed by the
MAC oracle. This check guarantees that the MAC cannot be forged and corresponds to the SUF-
CMA property. Moreover, the oracles for computing KDF256 and KDF128 are pseudo-random
functions (defined as in Appendix D).
It is difficult to guide CryptoVerif to transform G1 into G2, so we proceed differently. We
choose randomly a boolean b, write a game that runs as G1 when b is true and as G2 when b is
false, and show secrecy of b. This property proves that G1 is indistinguishable from G2 (with
overwhelming probability).
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Game G1:
Ogen() := k
R← mac_key; return();
(
foreach i ≤ qMAC do
O_MAC(m : bitstring) := return(MAC(k ,m))
) | (
foreach i ≤ qVer do
O_Ver(mv : bitstring,mac : t_SHA256_out) := return((mac = MAC(k ,mv)))
) | (
foreach i ≤ qKDF256 do
O_KDF256(X2 : t_SHA256_out,U2 : t_id,V2 : t_id) := return(KDF256(k ,X2 ,U2 ,V2 ))
) | (
foreach i ≤ qKDF128 do
O_KDF128(X3 : t_SHA256_out,U3 : t_id,V3 : t_id) := return(KDF128(k ,X3 ,U3 ,V3 ))
)
Game G2:
Ogen() := k
R← mac_key; return();
(
foreach i ≤ qMAC do
O_MAC(m : bitstring) := return(MAC(k ,m))
) | (
foreach i ≤ qVer do
O_Ver(mv : bitstring,mac : t_SHA256_out) :=
find j = j ′ ≤ qMAC suchthat defined(m[j ′]) ∧ (mv = m[j ′]) ∧ (mac = MAC(k ,mv)) then
return(true)
else
return(false)
) | (
foreach i ≤ qKDF256 do
O_KDF256(X2 : t_SHA256_out,U2 : t_id,V2 : t_id) :=
find [unique] j2 = j
′
2 ≤ qKDF256 suchthat defined(X2 [j′2],U2 [j′2],V2 [j′2], r2[j′2]) ∧
(X2 = X2 [j′2]) ∧ (U2 = U2 [j′2]) ∧ (V2 = V2 [j′2]) then
return(r2[j2])
else
r2
R← mac_key; return(r2)
) | (
foreach i ≤ qKDF128 do
O_KDF128(X3 : t_SHA256_out,U3 : t_id,V3 : t_id) :=
find [unique] j3 = j
′
3 ≤ qKDF128 suchthat defined(X3 [j′3],U3 [j′3],V3 [j′3], r3[j′3]) ∧
(X3 = X3 [j′3]) ∧ (U3 = U3 [j′3]) ∧ (V3 = V3 [j′3]) then
return(r3[j3])
else
r3
R← enc_key; return(r3)
)
Figure 14: HMAC-SHA256 is SUF-CMA, and KDF256 and KDF128 are independent PRFs
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Game G1:
Ogen() := k
R← mac_key; return();
(
foreach i ≤ qMAC do
O_MAC(m : bitstring) := return(MAC(k ,m))
) | (
foreach i ≤ qColl do
O_Coll(m1 : bitstring,m2 : bitstring) := return((MAC(k ,m1 ) = MAC(k ,m2 )))
)
Game G2:
Ogen() := k
R← mac_key; return();
(
foreach i ≤ qMAC do
O_MAC(m : bitstring) := return(MAC(k ,m))
) | (
foreach i ≤ qColl do
O_Coll(m1 : bitstring,m2 : bitstring) := return((m1 = m2 ))
)
Figure 15: HMAC-SHA256 is collision resistant
F HMAC-SHA256 is Collision Resistant
Our goal is to show that the game G1 shown in Figure 15 is indistinguishable from the game
G2 shown in the same figure (with overwhelming probability) using the assumption that MAC,
KDF256, and KDF128 are independent pseudo-random functions, as shown in Appendix D from
two different assumptions. (In fact, knowing that MAC is a pseudo-random function would be
sufficient.)
The game G1 defines an oracle Ogen that generates the key k, and then provides 2 oracles:
one for computing MACs, and one that tests equality between the MACs of two messages m1
and m2. The game G2 is similar, but tests equality between messages m1 and m2.
As in Appendix E, it is difficult to guide CryptoVerif to transform G1 into G2, so we choose
randomly a boolean b, write a game that runs as G1 when b is true and as G2 when b is false, and
show secrecy of b. This property proves that G1 is indistinguishable from G2 (with overwhelming
probability).
Inria
RESEARCH CENTRE
PARIS
2 rue Simone Iff
CS 42112
75589 Paris Cedex 12
Publisher
Inria
Domaine de Voluceau - Rocquencourt
BP 105 - 78153 Le Chesnay Cedex
inria.fr
ISSN 0249-6399
